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I. INTRODUCTION 
Foreigners working outside their home country often send regular remittances home. This 
paper develops a model in which an altruistic worker, with some degree of “attachment” to 
her home country, maximizes private welfare by allocating her revenue between 
consumption in the country of residence, family consumption in the home country, 
acquisition of financial assets in the country of residence, and acquisition of financial and 
nonfinancial assets, such as real estate, in the home country. The model has some 
implications that can be estimated. In particular, the model predicts that if workers have some 
degree of attachment to their home country, then the long-run elasticity between remittances 
and the acquisition of nonfinancial assets, such as real estate, must be positive. At the same 
time, if they are altruistic, the elasticity between remittances and real wages or real GDP in 
the home country must be negative, and the elasticity of remittances with respect to wages in 
their country of residence must be positive. It also predicts that if motives for portfolio 
diversification are behind workers’ transactions with their home country, then there should 
be a positive semi-elasticity between workers’ stock of financial assets in the home country 
and the interest rate differential between the home country and the country of residence, 
holding the long-run level of remittances constant. This is asset substitution.  
The model is applied to remittances to Morocco, using co-integration techniques. All the 
above-mentioned predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence, except for the 
prediction on portfolio diversification, which could imply that portfolio diversification 
motives may not be significant in Moroccan workers’ decisions to remit. Therefore, the 
empirical evidence seems to suggest that the usual risks associated with the volatility of 
capital flows may not be present in the case of remittance flows to Morocco. In other words, 
the evidence does not support an argument for a sharp decline in the level of remittances to 
Morocco in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the paper also argues that the analysis has 
only focused on one potential source of volatility, namely interest rates. The stability of 
remittances should also be seen in a broader context of the overall economic environment, 
which affects economic agents’ levels of confidence in the country’s policies. In this regard, 
the paper argues that the fact that remittances in Morocco are mostly channeled toward real 
estate construction, even though many of the workers who remit are likely to be 
entrepreneurs, should give an additional incentive to Moroccan authorities to accelerate 
economic reforms in order to further enhance the country’s potential as an investment 
destination. 
The literature on remittances can be divided in two segments, one focusing on the causes and 
uses of remittances, and the other on the macroeconomic impact of remittances.2 The first 
segment emphasizes the role of altruism and family ties as a motivation for remittances.3 
However, some other theories have focused on the idea that there can be self-interested 
                                                 
2 See for example Taylor (1999) and Elbadawi and Rocha (1992), Russell (1986), and, more recently, Chami, 
Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2003) for a review of the literature on remittances. 
3 See for example Johnson and Whitelaw (1974), and Lucas and Stark (1988). 
- 4 - 
reasons for remitting as well, which nevertheless center on the family.4 The family can also 
be thought of as playing the role of an insurance company that provides members with 
protection against income shocks by diversifying the sources of income.5 The family can also 
function as a bank that finances migration for some members. The borrowers remit funds in 
order to repay the loans.6 Nonetheless, Chami and Fisher (1996) argue that these 
arrangements may not be as self-interested as they may appear and show that altruism can 
lead to risk-sharing arrangements that are self enforcing. Other authors have examined the 
possibility of portfolio investment motives behind remittances.7 Regarding the 
macroeconomic impact of remittances in the recipient countries, the literature tends to 
emphasize the point that remittances increase family consumption and are not invested in 
productive assets,8 with the possible exception of real estate. Other authors suggest that when 
remittances are invested in productive assets other than real estate, they can have Keynesian 
multiplier effects on the economy, which nonetheless will only have a short-term impact.9 
Finally, evidence suggests that remittances could be detrimental to long-run growth by 
reducing labor-force participation or, because of asymmetric information between recipients 
and remitters, by leading to other moral hazard problems, which encourage recipients of 
remittances to undertake riskier projects.10  
This study could be seen as part of the literature on the workers’ motives to remit, even 
though the use of remittances is only indirectly discussed. Nonetheless, it has two features 
that distinguish it from the literature previously mentioned. First, besides the notion of 
altruism, which could be viewed as a willingness to assist parents or friends left in the home 
country, the paper explicitly introduces the notion of workers’ “attachment” to their home 
country, which could be viewed as a willingness to maintain ties in the home country through 
a nonfinancial asset such as a real estate. By doing so, it provides some theoretical 
foundations as to why remittances are often invested in real estate. This extends the 
theoretical literature on the causes of remittances, which has centered around altruism alone. 
This addition has an implication that tends to refine the claim on the effects of remittances on 
the economic performance of recipient countries. This motive to remit, will not necessarily 
                                                 
4 Lucas and Stark (1985) find evidence for self-interested behavior in Botswana and suggest that one reason for 
remitting could be that migrants may have investments that need attention while they are away. 
5 See Stark (1991), Agarwal and Horowitz (2002), Gubert (2002), Abel and Kotlikoff (1988), Altonji and 
Kotlikoff (1992), and Townsend (1994) among others. 
6 See Poirine (1997), and Ilahi and Jafarey (1999).   
7 See for example Straubhar (1986), Wahba (1991), and, more recently, Gordon and Gupta (2004). 
8 See Obeirai and Singh (1980), Durand and others (1996), Gilani (1981), Glytsos (1993), Alderman (1996), 
Adams (1998, 1991), Brown (1997), Sofranko and Idris (1999), Lopez and Seligson (1991), and Taylor (1992).  
9 See Stahl and Habib (1989), Nishat and Bilgrami (1991), Glytsos (1993), Adelman and Taylor (1990), and 
Durand, Parrado, and Massey (1996). 
10 See Kozel and Alderman (1990), Itzigsohn (1995), Gilani (1981), Amjad (1986), Ahmed (1986), and Chami, 
Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2003). 
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discourage labor force participation. Remittances may, in fact, boost economic growth in 
some sectors, such as real estate. This theoretical prediction is supported by the evidence in 
the case of Morocco. By sustaining economic performance in the construction sector, 
remittances may help increase employment with its accompanying potential positive 
multiplier effects on demand and therefore output. Before assessing the effect of remittances 
on growth, therefore construction GDP should be separated from the rest of the economy, 
and the potential effects of labor (mis)allocation between the two sectors carefully isolated. 
The second distinguishing feature of the study is that portfolio diversification motives for 
remittances are not examined separately from other motives, neither in the theoretical model 
nor in the empirical investigation. This unified framework implies that other prices, such as 
exchange rates and not only wages and interest rates, could play an important role on the 
level of remittances.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model of workers’ remittances and 
discusses its testable implications. Section III introduces the characteristics of remittances in 
Morocco and their impact on monetary policy and the sustainability of the country’s external 
position. The model’s predictions are then used to empirically investigate the determinants of 
remittances in Morocco. Conclusions and policy implications are provided in Section IV. The 
appendices present some theoretical derivations, as well as a brief summary of the 
econometric techniques. 
II. THE MODEL AND ITS MAIN IMPLICATIONS 
The paper models a worker residing abroad as an economic agent who each period, 
maximizes her expected lifetime utility by allocating revenue between transfers to the home 
country, consumption and asset accumulation, including real estate in the home country. The 
worker then solves the following problem: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )jjjj CLnCLnHLn γαβ ++=∑∞
=
*
j
tj
t-j
t    Max U  
Subject each period j to ( 2 ), ( 3 ), ( 4 ), and ( 5 ).  
 ( 1 )
 
 
P*j C*j  + M*j  + B*j  - B*j-1   = W*j + i*j  B*j-1 ( 2 )
Aj   = Aj-1  (1+ ij )  + ej M*j - Pj (Hj  - Hj-1  )  - ej T*j  ( 3 )
Hj  > 0    ( 4 ) 
Cj  = (Pj Wj + ej T*j  )/ Pj,  ( 5 ) 
 
where subscripts t and j denote the period. Ut denotes the worker’s utility function. β is the 
worker’s time discount rate. Hj denotes the size of the nonfinancial asset (real estate) in the 
home country (construction costs/unit price of construction goods). C*j denotes the worker’s 
real consumption abroad. Cj denotes her parents' real consumption in the home country. αj is 
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her degree of “attachment” to the home country. γj is her degree of altruism toward parents 
left in the home country. P*j denotes consumption goods prices abroad. M*j denotes the 
worker’s total transfers to the home country in foreign currency (this is what enters in the 
balance of payments (BOP)). B*j is her end-of-period net assets held abroad in foreign 
currency. W*j is the worker’s earnings in foreign currency. i*j is the level of interest rates 
abroad. Aj is the worker’s net financial assets in the home country (balance of bank accounts 
held in the home country). The asset value is denominated in the home-country currency. ij is 
the level of interest rates in the home country. Pj is price index in the home country. ej is the 
exchange rate. It is the amount of home-country currency per unit of foreign currency. T*j 
denotes the worker’s transfers to parents left in the home country, while Wj denotes the 
nominal level of wages in the home country. 
Equation ( 2 ) is the budget constraint faced each period by the worker. It says that the 
amount of spending in consumption abroad, transfers to the home country and asset 
accumulation must be equal to total income in the period, including interest income. Given 
the fact that M*j can be positive or negative in equation ( 2 ), the model allows for portfolio 
diversification.  
Equation ( 3 ) gives the law of motion of the interest-earning account held by the worker in 
the home country. It increases with the interest rate and the amount of transfers. However, it 
declines as money is withdrawn to finance construction and maintenance of real estate or to 
support relatives or friends in the home country. Equation ( 4 ) just says that the nonfinancial 
asset must remain positive. 
Equation ( 5 ) assumes that the worker’s family in the home country consumes all her 
revenue, including the transfers from the worker. This assumption is used solely to simplify 
the model. One could assume that only a fraction of the revenue is consumed each period 
without altering the results. One could also make the level of family’s consumption an 
outcome of an optimization problem where the worker’s family solves an intertemporal 
problem and could acquire her own assets to smooth consumption. However, such an 
approach would not only add complications to the model, but it will not be very realistic. The 
reason is that families receiving transfers from parents’ living abroad are less likely to build 
sizeable stocks of financial assets because of their modest living conditions.  
Note that such a representation of a worker’s welfare takes into account future generations 
utility, but discounts it at a rate β. Note also that Hj , the size of the nonfinancial asset (real 
estate) enters directly in the utility function. This formulation implicitly assumes that the 
services, and the flow of “satisfaction” provided by a nonfinancial asset in the nature of a real 
estate increases with the size of the asset. Finally, note that the terms αj and γj , which 
respectively capture attachment to the home country and the degree of altruism, can also vary 
over time. An increase in the degree of attachment to the home country should be expected to 
increase the desired size of the nonfinancial asset, and therefore increase transfers destined to 
accumulating such an asset. Similarly, an increase in the degree of altruism should also be 
expected to increase the amount of consumption Cj one would like her relatives to enjoy. The 
implications of the model will now be examined. 
At the optimum, among other things, it is shown in the Appendix that we have the following 
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** jjjjjj CPeCP γ=   ( 6 )
Equation ( 6 ) links the level of consumption the worker wants her family to have to her own 
level of consumption in the country of residence. Note the important role of the degree of 
altruism γj. The greater the degree of altruism, the greater the level of consumption enjoyed 
by the worker’s family for a given level of her own consumption in the country of residence. 
Using equation ( 5 ), one can easily see why the model will imply that a greater degree of 
altruism will lead to larger transfers to the home country. This will be established more 
explicitly in the Appendix. 
The steady state or long run in this framework is defined as an equilibrium where the 
exchange rate, the degree of altruism and attachment to homeland, interest rates, the inflation 
rates in the home country and abroad, the rates of growth of transfers, financial and 
nonfinancial assets are all constant. It is shown in the Appendix that such a steady state exists 
and that in particular, it implies that 
 
**1 )(
jjhjj
j
j
jjj
j
jj CPaCstr
g
P
ge
HHP
e
HP α=≡−= − ,  ( 7 )
 
where g is the long-run growth rate of transfers as well as financial and nonfinancial assets, 
and ha  a constant term that depends on the long-run interest and inflation rates. Note that 
Cstr is the amount of construction of real estate or the acquisition of other nonfinancial assets 
by the worker in the home country. 
 
Equation ( 7 ) says that in the long-run or steady-state, the acquisition of nonfinancial assets 
by the worker in her home country will strongly depend on αj, her degree of attachment to 
her home country as well as on her level of consumption in her country of residence. Note 
the important role played by the degree of attachment to the home country in equation ( 7 ). 
The higher the degree of attachment to the home country, the larger the desired level of 
nonfinancial asset. Using equation ( 3 ), one can intuitively see why the model would imply 
larger transfers to the home country if the worker’s degree of attachment to the home country 
increases. We can now turn to the empirical implications of the model. 
It is shown in the Appendix that the model presented in the previous section implies, once 
log-linearized around the steady-state, that the long-run relation between remittances and 
their determinants is as given in equation ( 9 ) and the short-run relation as in equation ( 12 ). 
These equations imply clear altruistic motives behind remittances, meaning that remittances 
will increase with poor economic performances in the home country, and with good 
performances in the country of residence. They also imply that “attachment to homeland,” as 
captured by the construction of real estate in the home country, should imply a positive 
elasticity between remittances and the amount of construction GDP. Both relations also 
include the level of financial assets held in the home country and the interest rates 
differentials between the worker’s home country and her country of residence. Therefore, the 
equations allow one to see if holding remittances constant, the stock of financial assets held 
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by the worker in her home country increases with the interest rate differential. They also help 
assess whether portfolio diversifications motives are significant behind remittances. Both 
regression equations will later be tested in the case of Morocco.  
 
III. THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
A.   Remittances in Morocco  
This section argues why remittances are important in Morocco for macroeconomic policy 
and why this country is relevant to the effort of testing the theory. It also discusses how this 
theory could shed light on the debate about the stability of remittances in Morocco. 
Table 1. Morocco: Balance of Payments (1996–2003) 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Prel.
( In percent of GDP )
Current account balance 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -1.4 4.8 4.1 3.1
Trade balance -6.0 -5.6 -6.5 -6.9 -9.7 -8.9 -8.5 -9.9
Exports 18.8 21.1 19.9 21.3 22.3 21.1 21.7 19.5
Imports -24.8 -26.6 -26.4 -28.2 -32.0 -30.0 -30.2 -29.3
Services 2.6 2.2 2.4 3.2 3.4 5.6 5.4 5.4
Of which : tourism receipts 4.6 4.3 4.9 5.5 6.1 7.6 7.3 6.9
Income -3.6 -3.5 -2.9 -2.8 -2.6 -2.5 -2.0 -1.6
Transfers 7.0 6.6 6.5 6.1 7.4 10.5 9.2 9.1
Of which  : workers' remittances 5.9 5.7 5.6 5.5 6.5 9.6 8.0 8.0
Capital and finanical account 0.2 1.5 0.8 5.5 -0.1 5.8 -1.8 0.9
Reserve accumulation -0.8 -1.7 -0.7 -4.6 1.2 -11.3 -1.8 -3.9
Errors and amoissions 0.5 0.4 0.3 -0.4 0.3 0.8 -0.6 0.0
Sources: Moroccan authorities; and IMF staff estimates  
 
The evolution of workers’ remittances to Morocco is mainly characterized by a sudden surge 
in 2001,11 which is not yet fully explained (Table 1 and Figure 1). Since then, their level has 
remained high compared to other countries, at about 9 percent of GDP and about 25 percent 
of exports of goods and services. For example, in percent of GDP, they are 3 percent in 
Egypt, 1 percent in Turkey, 5 percent in Tunisia, and 18 percent in Jordan.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 A similar phenomenon was observed in Pakistan at the same time, where remittances moved from about 
2 percent of GDP before 2001 to more than 6 percent of GDP after 2002.  
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Figure 1. Workers’ Remittances 
Remittances relative to GDP and Exports of Goods and Services
(in percent)
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Sources: Moroccan authorities; and IMF staff estimates 
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In percent of exports of goods and services, they are 16 percent in Egypt, 3 percent in 
Turkey, 13 percent in Tunisia, 42 percent in Jordan. Remittances in Morocco mostly 
originate from Europe, especially France, Italy, and Spain.  
Transfers are made partly through the banking system but also through postal and other 
money-transfer services (Figure 1). A significant share of transfers is made in cash, 
especially when Moroccans living abroad travel to their home country. This share is 
estimated through foreign currency exchanges that are made at the central bank or at other 
foreign exchange providers, and is included in the estimate of total transfers. 
The impact of workers’ remittances on Morocco’s external position and the conduct of 
monetary policy is significant. The remittances almost cover the trade deficit and have 
contributed to the recent surpluses of the external current account, as well as the overall BOP 
(Table 1). The BOP surpluses have contributed to the strengthening of Morocco’s external 
position through the accumulation of reserves, which now cover the external public debt. The 
transfers also contribute to the liquidity of the banking system and affect the conduct of 
monetary policy, as evidenced by the recent policy measures taken by Bank Al Maghrib 
(BAM) to absorb that liquidity.12 Therefore, understanding the long-run behavior of workers’ 
remittances will be essential to both the long-term sustainability of Morocco’s external 
position and the conduct of monetary policy.  
In Morocco, all the motives for remitting that have been discussed in the theoretical section 
(or Section II) are potentially relevant. Furthermore, evidence in favor of the significance of a 
given group of motives has implications as to the stability of those remittances flow. 
Altruism or solidarity motives as a determinant of workers’ remittances to Morocco could 
contribute to their stability in the long run, mainly because it seems reasonable to expect such 
motives to remain stable.13 However, the stability of such motives should also be seen in the 
context of changes in migration patterns. For instance, the migration of family members may 
reduce the scope for “altruistic” motives. Nonetheless, in the case of Morocco, this effect 
would be counterbalanced by the new waves of immigrants who are attracted by the 
increasing labor demand in industrialized countries. Moreover, altruistic motives for 
remittances may in fact partly reflect self-interested reasons for transfers from Moroccans 
who want their residential investments to be looked after when they are away. Therefore, 
“altruistic” flows could be thought of as being fairly stable. Evidence of altruism can be 
captured by a negative long-run correlation of remittances with wages in the home country. 
In the specific case of Morocco, one would expect altruism to be evidenced by a negative 
correlation between transfers and real GDP in Morocco. An additional indicator that could be 
considered is income in the country of residence. A positive correlation between income in 
                                                 
12 In order to absorb liquidity in the Moroccan banking system, BAM has recently used reserve requirements 
and interest rates on its deposit facilities. In addition, an auction mechanism to further absorb bank liquidity has 
just been introduced.  
13 According to the authorities, part of such solidarity motives could be explained by workers’ strong family 
ties to Morocco, where they have left their parents, as well as children in some cases.   
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the country of residence and transfers, holding everything else constant, could also be seen as 
an indication of altruism or solidarity, since it would suggest a willingness to “share.” 
Attachment to homeland could also contribute to the stability of remittances in the long run, 
since one would expect such motives to remain stable. However, improved settlement 
opportunities for Moroccans in their countries of residence may in theory reduce their 
attachment to Morocco. Nonetheless these improvements in settlement opportunities could 
be expected to occur at a slow pace, therefore having in a foreseeable future, only a limited 
offsetting impact on Moroccans’ attachment to their homeland. Attachment to the homeland 
could be assessed with the construction of real estate in Morocco by Moroccans living abroad 
or any other asset that could reflect their ties to Morocco. Therefore, the value added of the 
construction sector would then be a natural candidate for a proxy of Moroccans’ attachment 
to their homeland. One would then expect remittances to be positively correlated with 
construction GDP. Construction of real estate could also be seen as an investment decision 
based on profitability considerations. However, the evidence on housing prices (Figure 2) 
would not support such an explanation in the case of Morocco.  
Remittances as portfolio investment flows could be expected to add to a country’s 
vulnerability since one would expect them to be sensitive to their rate of return. A small part 
of remittances are made by Moroccans who are willing to create small and medium-sized 
enterprises in Morocco. This is a direct investment flow that could also be interpreted as a 
sign of their attachment to their home country, and therefore one that is not expected to add 
to the country’s vulnerability. However, the existence of such investments also implies that 
remittances, because of their potential investment nature, could be sensitive to their rate of 
return. If this were true, one would expect deposits held in Morocco by Moroccans living 
abroad to be positively correlated with interest rates in Morocco and negatively with interest 
rates abroad. 
The exchange rate through the “substitution” and “wealth” effects could also influence the 
level of remittances. The overall effect of exchange rates movements is not always clear a 
priori because it is the sum of both the “substitution” and “wealth” effects. The idea behind 
the substitution effect is that because goods in the home country are less expensive with the 
devaluation or depreciation of the currency, one does not need to transfer as much money as 
before to buy a given amount of goods, and may even substitute some goods in the home 
country for the more expensive ones in the country of residence. On the other hand, a 
devaluation or depreciation of the home country’s exchange rate can also enable its citizens 
to live abroad “wealthier,” and therefore give them incentives to transfer more money in 
order to buy even more goods, including building residential real estate, in the home country, 
which are now less expensive. This is the “wealth” effect. However, even if the actual effect 
of exchange rate movements were known, interpreting their long-term impact on the 
sustainability of the external position would be difficult.14    
                                                 
14 For example, even if a devaluation or a depreciation of the currency can temporarily attract flows from 
workers willing to buy goods in their home country because they have become less expensive, this factor can 
also undermine their confidence in the economy in the long run.  
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National policies toward workers living abroad could be an important qualitative determinant 
for transfers in general. In Morocco, the authorities would like to keep Moroccans living 
abroad attracted to their home country. To this end, they have created a ministry in charge of 
Moroccans living abroad (Ministère délégué auprès des affaires étrangères et de la 
cooperation chargé des Marocains Résidents à l’Etranger), which, among other things, helps 
streamline the administrative procedures related to their transactions with their home country. 
The model in this paper will not consider such qualitative items explicitly. 
The surge of remittances in 2001 could remain unexplained, even after considering the 
potential factors discussed above. Since the empirical application of the model focuses on the 
long-term determinants of remittances, no analysis of this specific phenomenon (the surge in 
remittances in 2001) will be provided. However, it is possible that in addition to the wealth 
effect of the devaluation15 discussed above, the surge in remittances could also be explained 
by an increase in Moroccans’ “attachment” to their home country. Various events in the new 
post-September 11 environment could support an explanation based on the attachment to the 
home country. 
B.   Empirical Findings for Morocco 
The existence of a long-run relation as presented in equation ( 9 ) is tested and estimated 
using Johansen (1991) approach (Tables 4 and 5). The short-run or error-correction relation 
in equation ( 12 ) is estimated by OLS (ordinary least squared) in Table 6. Using the Granger 
representation theorem,16 equation ( 12 ) will confirm the existence of a long-run relation 
between remittances and their determinants as implied by the model. 
 
)(1.03.19
2.4105.48.1
*
**
jjj
jjjoj
iieLog
WLogCstrLogALogWLogaMLog
−∗−∗+
∗−∗+∗−∗+=
  ( 8 )
 
An estimate of the co-integration or long-run relation between remittances and their 
determinants as implied by the model is presented in equation ( 8 ). Since the relevant 
variables implied by the model are non stationary, estimating the model using a standard 
ordinary least square technique (OLS) could give a spurious regression equation, which 
could cause misleading inferences.17 Therefore, a vector autoregression (VAR) is used to test 
for the existence of a stationary linear combination of the non stationary variables using 
Johansen (1991) method. Such a linear combination represents the long-run relationship 
among the variables. One can refer to Figure 6 to see how the VAR fits the data and Table 3 
                                                 
15 There was a 5 percent devaluation of the dirham with respect to the U.S. dollar in April 2001.  
16 See Engle and Granger (1987), Banerjee, Hendry and Smith (1986) and Kremers, Ericsson and Dolado 
(1992). 
17 See for example Yule (1926), Granger and Newbold (1974), Phillips (1986) for further discussion.  
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for the misspecification tests. Figure 4 presents deviations of remittances from their (long-
run) value as predicted in equation ( 8 ).18 
a0 is an estimated constant term. A random error term is omitted for brevity. It is the 
deviation of remittances from the long-run value as defined in equation ( 8 ) and shown in 
Figure 4. Remittances and wages abroad (France) are in French francs or Euro. The real GDP 
in Morocco, which is used as a proxy for wages in Morocco in Morocco is in dirham. The 
real value added of the construction sector in Morocco is in French francs or in Euro. The 
exchange rate is in dirham per French franc or per euro. The interest rate differential is the 
difference between interest rates in Morocco and France in percent. Financial assets held in 
Morocco are the dirham equivalent of the end-of-period stock of total deposits held in 
Moroccan bank accounts by Moroccans living abroad.19  
 
Empirical results presented in equation ( 8 ) are in line with a priori expectations. 
Remittances may partly be driven by a willingness to share, which would support the 
argument for altruism as a strong determinant of remittances in Morocco. Wages in France 
are used as a proxy for incomes of Moroccans living abroad, as well as the stock of financial 
assets they hold in their countries of residence. The logarithm allows one to abstract from the 
actual levels and focus only on growth and the elasticities. Therefore, taking the logarithm of 
wages in France assumes that its growth rate is positively correlated to the growth of income 
and financial assets held by Moroccans living abroad in their country of residence. This 
assumption seems reasonable since most of the remittances originate from Europe, especially 
France, Italy, and Spain. Note that the coefficient on *jWLog  in equation ( 8 ) is not the 
value of the actual elasticity of remittances with respect to wages abroad. However, one can 
see with equation ( 9 ) that its positive sign implies that the latter would also be positive. The 
reason why the coefficient is not the wage elasticity stems from the fact that wages in France 
are also used as a proxy for financial assets held by Moroccans living abroad in their 
countries of residence. However, the latter are expected to have a negative elasticity because 
an increase in assets abroad, everything else held constant, including wages and consumption 
                                                 
18 An alternative test was performed to confirm whether the vector in equation 1 is indeed a co-integration 
vector. The framework for this test is provided by Banerjee, Hendry and Smith (1986) and Kremers, Ericsson 
and Dolado (1992). The test essentially checks whether the coefficient on the term in equation ( 12 ) is negative 
and significant. Estimation results and ‘t’ statistics are presented in Table 6. Note that the ‘t’ statistics do not 
have the standard ‘t’ distribution. 
 
19 One should note that accounts held by Moroccans living abroad in the Moroccan banking system are both in 
the form of interest bearing and noninterest bearing accounts. The latter represent about one third of total sight 
deposits in Morocco. At end-December 2003, the overall balance on noninterest bearing accounts held by 
Moroccans living abroad was equivalent to about half of the balance on their interest bearing ones. These facts 
tend to support the view that those accounts may not be part of a portfolio investment strategy. However, we 
have used the total balance on both interest and noninterest bearing accounts because noninterest bearing 
accounts can be used at any time to credit interest bearing ones and vice-versa. Therefore, if one ignores 
noninterest bearing accounts, one could loose information related to the fact that some funds in those accounts 
can in theory be held most of the time in interest bearing ones and then transferred in noninterest bearing 
accounts when they are needed. Moreover, taking total deposits will still capture the information about time 
deposits because the latter have the greatest share in total deposits. 
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in the country of residence, will tend to reduce remittances to the home country. Therefore, 
the positive coefficient on wages implies that the wage elasticity is positive, implying a 
willingness to share.  
The negative elasticity for GDP provides additional evidence that altruistic or solidarity 
motives could partly be behind remittances in Morocco. GDP is a proxy for real incomes in 
Morocco. As implied in the theoretical framework, the negative correlation between 
remittances and real incomes in the home country, everything else being equal, is an 
indication that Moroccans living abroad could be taking into account the well-being of their 
Morocco-based families in their decision-making process. 
The positive elasticity for Cstr suggests that attachment to one’s homeland may be another 
strong motive behind the remittances in Morocco. Cstr is a proxy for the volume of real 
estate construction in Morocco made by Moroccans living abroad. As suggested by  
equation ( 7 ) such a phenomenon in the long run is possible only if Moroccans living abroad 
have some degree of attachment to their home country. As Figure 2 illustrates, the price 
index for housing, which grows at approximately the same rate as the whole price index, 
does not show any specific pattern that could significantly tie real estate construction by 
Moroccans living abroad to some form of investment.  
The wealth effect of the exchange rate depreciation should not be excluded from the long-run 
determinants of remittances in Morocco. The coefficient on jeLog  is not the long-run value 
of the elasticity of remittances with respect to the exchange rate as seen in equation ( 9 ). 
However, the estimated short-run model suggests that this elasticity could be positive 
(equation (10) and Table 6).  
There is no evidence that portfolio diversification motives could be behind the remittances in 
the long-run. This claim is supported by the negative semi-elasticity of remittances with 
respect to interest rates differentials )( *jj ii −  and the negative coefficient on jALog . The 
negative signs of these two coefficients imply that holding everything else constant, 
including the long-run level of remittances and financial assets abroad, an increase in the 
interest differential in favor of Morocco will not increase the long-run amount of deposits 
held in Morocco by Moroccans living abroad (Figure 3). Therefore, this finding implies that 
those deposits may not be accumulated as part of a portfolio diversification strategy. 
Furthermore, the negative elasticity for jALog  also suggests that increases in remittances 
could be associated with a draw down of those deposits. This supports the argument that 
those deposits could merely be transitory accounts that are used to complement spending in 
the home country when necessary. 
Even though the analysis could be made richer by adding other variables that have been left 
aside, one should note that the model satisfactorily fits the data, including during the period 
since 2001, when the surge in remittances is observed (Figures 6 and 7). However, the model 
cannot irrevocably attribute the surge in remittances to a specific factor or group of factors. 
The wealth effect of the devaluation of the dirham, which occurred at that time, could be a 
potential explanatory factor. However, one cannot reach such a conclusion with certainty 
without a much deeper analysis, which should also include countries such as Pakistan, where 
a similar surge in remittances was observed during the same period. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper has presented a model in which an altruistic worker, with some degree of 
“attachment” to her home country, maximizes private welfare by allocating her revenue 
between consumption in the country of residence, family consumption in the home country, 
acquisition of financial assets in the country of residence, and acquisition of financial and 
nonfinancial assets, such as real estate, in the home country. The model has some 
implications regarding the relation between the worker’s remittances and wages in her home 
country, wages in her country of residence, her degree of attachment to her home country, the 
structure of her portfolio and interest rate differentials between the home country and the 
country of residence. The model has been tested in the case of remittances to Morocco. The 
findings could have implications on the debate about the stability of remittances and help 
derive some policy recommendations.  
The findings suggest that there is no evidence that implies significant risks for a sharp 
slowdown or reversal of workers’ remittances to Morocco in the foreseeable future. The 
analysis suggests that altruism or solidarity, attachment to homeland, and economic growth 
in the countries of residence could be the main long-run determinants of workers’ 
remittances to Morocco. Moreover, there is no strong evidence that motives for portfolio 
diversification are significant among the long-run explanatory factors. This finding 
potentially lowers the above mentioned risks. However, for future research on the possibility 
of having portfolio diversification as a motive to remit, one could use other related indicators, 
such as stock market indices, in addition to interest rates on deposits.   
The evidence on Moroccans’ attachment to their home country supports the view that 
Morocco should maintain its economic and political reform efforts, which could further help 
diversify the investment allocation of remittance inflows, limit the negative impact that 
remittances could have on labor force participation, and therefore help sustain a broad-based 
economic growth.20 The evidence suggests that Moroccans living abroad already show some 
attachment to their home country, as confirmed by the positive long-run correlation between 
remittances to Morocco and the value added of the construction sector. However, because 
this spending in Morocco is concentrated in the construction sector and because only a small 
portion of remittances goes to the creation of small and medium-size enterprises, Morocco 
does not fully take advantage of the skills of the new generations who, according to the 
authorities’ own analysis, are not only highly qualified but are also more likely to be 
entrepreneurs. Therefore, Morocco could further utilize the entrepreneurial skills of its 
citizens living abroad, which along with the attachment to their home country, could 
potentially increase remittances through investment and boost Morocco’s economic growth.
                                                 
20 The negative impact of remittances on labor force participation could be mitigated in Morocco by the fact 
that most family members who receive support from abroad are parents, wife and children or younger brothers 
and sisters who often are too old or too young to join the labor force. 
 - 16 - APPENDIX 
 
A. Solving the Model 
 
In this section, ∆jLogX denotes the first difference in logarithm of X from its previous-period 
value (i.e., ∆jX ≡ Log(Xj)- Log(Xj-1 ) ). X  denotes the long-run or steady state value of X. 
DjLogX denotes the first difference in logarithm of X from its long-run value X  (i.e., 
jjj XLogLogXLogXD −≡ ). It is shown that the long-run relation between remittances and 
their potential determinants is as in equation ( 9 ). 
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where the elasticities are defined as follows.  
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The short-run or error-correction model is given as in equation ( 12 ) 
 
( )
( ) ''01*j*ji
jjejjpjjwjj
1j
(-1)
AjA
*
jj
(-1)
BB
*
1
*
j
*
jijjejjp
jjwjj
*
1j
(-1)
B
*
jB
1j
(-1)
AjA
*
jj
**
j
1DDq 
LogeDq  LogPDq wLogDqLogCstrD
DqDqWLD))qq((
1
DDq LogeDq  LogPDq
 wLogDqLogCstrDDqDq
DqDqWLD  M LogD
jjmjij
h
jjw
jojm
jij
hjj
jjw
qECMiqi
q
LogALogAogq
qECM
iqi
qLogBLogB
LogALogAogq
νση
φ
νση
++−+++
++++
+++⋅+=
++−+
++++
++++
++=
−
−
−
−
−
 ( 12 )
 
assuming that 
0,10, 2121
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and that 
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jjj LogWLogB υφ +=
** 1   ( 14 )
 
Note that if capital was perfectly mobile, the model would predict that interest rates would be 
equalized up to the currencies’ depreciation rates and that the stocks of financial assets held 
in the home country and in the country of residence are indeterminate. However, a more 
realistic assumption relevant to the empirical investigation would be that of imperfect capital 
mobility.21 The paper will not explicitly present any specific form of capital control. Instead, 
it is assumed that because of capital controls, we have equation ( 13 ), which states that 
holding the exchange rate constant, an increase of interest rates abroad of one percent must 
be matched with a more than one percent increase in interest rates in the home country. This 
assumption is also consistent with the evidence on deposit rates in France, which will be used 
as a proxy for *ji  , and interest rates in Morocco.  
 
Equation ( 14 ) states that financial assets held by workers residing abroad increase with their 
wages, up to a term jυ  that is stationary. This assumption is made because in the empirical 
application there is no data on financial assets held by workers residing abroad in their 
countries of residence. One could have easily made this level of financial assets endogenous 
by solving for it as a discounted sum of future savings. However, one would then have to 
make another assumption about future wages and interest rates, which would just complicate 
the model without providing additional insight. In equation ( 12 ), jν  and 'jν  are stationary 
random terms and the coefficients qs are the elasticities, which depend on the steady values 
of the variables.  
 
Denote j1µ  and j2µ , respectively, as the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints represented 
in equations ( 2 ) and ( 3 ). The Lagrangian for the optimization problem in equation ( 1 ) is  
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21 In Morocco, where the model is applied, there are no restrictions on the transfers of proceeds from the 
liquidation of assets if the assets are purchased with an inflow of foreign exchange. Otherwise, the proceeds 
must be deposited in a dirham convertible account and may be transferred over a period of five years. 
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Using equation ( 20 ), equations ( 16 ) and ( 17 ) imply that we have: 
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Using equations ( 18 ) and ( 19 ) , equations ( 16 ) and ( 17 ) imply that we have 
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Using equation ( 19 ), equation ( 15 ) implies equation ( 7 ), with 
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1
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ahj ++−= π  
Assuming that the variables remain in the “neighborhood” of their steady state values, 
especially that equation ( 7 ) holds even out of a steady state provided a stationary random 
term jϕ  is added, that is, 
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we can log-linearize equations ( 2 ), ( 3 ), ( 5 ), ( 6 ) and ( 7 ) around the steady state, and 
then use the log-linearized version of equation ( 23 ) to rewrite the equations so as to 
eliminate domestic prices using the log-linearized version of equation ( 2 ).22 The resulting 
equations imply equations ( 9 ) and ( 12 ), where we have  
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after assuming that equations ( 13 ) and ( 14 ) hold and that the growth rate of assets held by 
workers residing abroad in the home country and abroad are stationary.  
 
Note that equation ( 24 ) is equivalent to equation ( 9 ), which is the long-run relation 
between remittances and their determinants as predicted by the model. 
  
Assuming the growth rate of financial assets is stationary implies that the term ECMj is 
stationary and will represent the co-integration or long-run relations between the non-
stationary variables included in the model. The empirical investigation will confirm the 
                                                 
22 The only purpose of this operation is to reduce the number variables that will be used in the VAR and to 
increase the degrees of freedom in order to have more reliable estimates of the long-run relation. This is not 
necessary when the sample size is large enough. Prices are chosen because they are the most likely to meet the 
assumption of small stationary deviations from the long-run values.  
 - 21 - APPENDIX 
stationarity of the growth rate of deposits in the home country. However, since there is no 
data on workers’ financial assets in their country of residence, there is no way to verify the 
validity the assumption on the stationarity of the growth rate of those assets.  
 
B.  A Summary of the Econometric Details 
 
The dataset considered on remittances shows a sign of seasonality, especially during the third 
quarter (Figure 1). Nonetheless, seasonality should not necessarily be interpreted as inflows 
related to tourism from Moroccans living abroad. Seasonality can also come from altruism if 
one allows for the possibility that transfers could be made in order to help the family spend 
an enjoyable vacation time. Notwithstanding those remarks, the estimation procedure has 
included seasonality dummies. 
 
All the potential explanatory factors discussed in section II, including interest rates cannot be 
ruled out a priori in the long-run relation determining workers’ remittances. As Table 2 
shows, the logarithm of remittances is integrated of order one, or difference-stationary. 
Therefore, for an explanatory factor to be considered as a potential determinant in the long-
run relation, it must have the same time-series properties as the level of remittances, that is, 
be integrated of order one. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for such properties 
could not reject the hypothesis of an order of integration of one for all the potential 
determinants considered as the table clearly shows. Note however that GDP shows a trend.  
The long-run relation presented in equation ( 9 ) is first estimated using the Johansen (1991) 
method. Because of the sample size constraint, a fourth-order VAR is used. It could not be 
checked whether such a model minimized the various information criteria. Therefore, 
additional procedures will be used to confirm the choice of the long-run relation. The 
determination of the co-integration vector was based on the interpretability of the vector in 
line of the model and the evidence, the co-integration graphs, as well as the result of formal 
testing, including testing using the error correction model given in equation ( 12 ). Whether 
the co-integration vector’s stationarity can be confirmed with ADF tests was also checked. 
The Johansen statistics (λtrace and λmax ) suggest that there is one co-integration vectors that 
can be derived from the unrestricted VAR (Table 4). To identify the vectors from the seven 
presented, an approach similar to Johansen and Juselius (1992) was used. We examined the 
direct interpretability of the co-integration vectors23 using the theory’s predictions and the 
evidence. Only vector 4 seems to match both the theory and the evidence.24  
                                                 
23 Generic identification techniques could also be used when identifying restrictions are available and intuitive. 
See for example Dickey and Rossana (1994), Johansen and Juselius (1994), Hendry and Mizon (1993), Nachega 
(2001a, 2001b). 
24 Vector 1, 2 and 3 in Table 4 would suggest that the long-run elasticity of remittances with construction GDP, 
which is a proxy for WRAs spending on construction is negative. This would contradict both the theory and the 
evidence (Figure 4). Vector 5, which is normalized on the interest rate differential has an adjustment coefficient 
that is positive and therefore does not lead to an equilibrium correcting path for the interest rate differential. The 
same argument on construction GDP can be used for vector 6. Vector 7 would contradict the theoretical 
(continued…) 
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The co-integration graph (Figure 6), the ADF tests (Table 2) and the error correction form of 
the model (Table 6) could not reject the vector as describing that long-run relation. Note that 
in the model in an error correction form given in equation ( 12 ), the misspecification tests in 
Table 6 do not reveal any problem, neither for residual autocorrelation (AR), skewness and 
excess kurtosis (normality), autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH ), nor 
heteroskedasticity (RESET test). The coefficient on the term ECM is negative and 
significant, even using the conservative Dickey-Fuller five percent critical value of -1.95. 
These findings support the choice of the vector as describing the long-run relation 
determining the level of remittances. The model also satisfactorily describes the short-run as 
illustrated in Figure 7. The co-integration vector has been normalized on the remittances and 
is presented in equation ( 8 ). 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
predictions on GDP in Morocco, and the evidence showing a positive correlation between wages abroad and 
transfers (Figure 4).  
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Figure 2. Potential Long-Run Determinants of Workers’ Remittances 
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Figure 2. Potential Long-Run Determinants of Workers’ Remittances (continued...) 
(In logarithm, unless otherwise indicated) 
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Figure 3. Deviation of Remittances from the Long-Run Value as Defined in Equation ( 8 ) 
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          Sources: Moroccan authorities; and IMF staff estimates. 
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Figure 4. Evolution of Transfers and Some Of Their Potential Long-Run Determinants 
(In logarithm of variables in French francs, unless otherwise indicated) 
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Figure 5. Transfers and Total Deposits and Their Fitted Values (VAR) 
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Figure 6. Remittances Growth Rates and Their Fitted Values (Error-correction model) 
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Table 2. ADF (4) Statistics for Unit Root Tests 
Variables t-ADF Lag (AIC) Lag (alt. model)
In (Log) levels
Remit -2.688 0
Wages_Fce (FF or Euro) -2.320 3
ERdh/FF_EUR -0.9331 1
IR_Mor - IR_Fce -1.804 0
Dep -2.418 1
Cstr -2.791 0
GDP -7.276** 3
IR_Mor -1.784 0
IR_Fce -2.172 1
Price -2.954 1
ECM -6.769** 0
In first differnces
Remit -7.832** 0
Wages_Fce (FF or Euro) -4.340** 0
ERdh/FF_EUR -3.663* 0
IR_Mor - IR_Fce -4.716** 0
Dep -9.564** 1
Cstr -7.557** 0
GDP -6.825** 4
IR_Mor -5.981** 0
IR_Fce -4.371** 0
Price -9.318** 0
Notes: The estimation period is 1993:Q1-2003:Q4.  The dataset is taken from the  Moroccan authorities and the International Financial 
Staistics. The variables are defined in section III.B. Foor each variable, values in the second column denotes the t-values of the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistics. The third column denotes the lag order that minimizes the Akaike information criteria (AIC) and the fourth, the 
lag order of an alternative model. The ADF statistics is testing a null hypothesis of a unit root in that variable  expressed in (Log) levels and 
first (Log) difference against an alternative of a stationary root. Each regression contains a constant, a trend and seasonal dummies. * and ** 
denote rejection at the 5 and 1 percent significance levels. The ADF tests were augmented with 4 lags, except for the ECM equation where it 
was augmented with 6 lags. The null hypothesis was rejected  for Dep_dh in levels at 5 percent level of significance when there was no lag 
added.  
Table 3. Residual Misspecification Test Statistics: First Order (Unrestricted) VAR 
Serial correlation (AR1-5) Normality 
F(5,2)  Chi ^2 ( 2 ) 
Remit 1.9895 [0.3675] 4.7665 [0.0923]
Wages_Fce 4.8750 [0.1789] 2.4347 [0.2960]
ERdh/FF_EUR 94.263 [0.0105]* 0.47203 [0.7898]
Dep  0.63581 [0.7048] 5.1025 [0.0780]
IR_Mor - IR_Fce 3.3969 [0.2429] 1.1497 [0.5628]
Cstr  2.6360 [0.2976]  1.4349 [0.4880]
GDP 1.6517 [0.4185] 3.2080 [0.2011]
Notes: The estimation period is 1993:Q1-2003:Q4.  The dataset is taken from the  Moroccan authorities and the 
International Financial Staistics. The variables are defined in section III.B. The vector auto regression is estimated 
with 4 lags and contains an unrestricted constant and seasonal dummies. The null hypothesis are that of no serial 
correlation, and of normality.  * and ** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 and 1 percent significance 
levels.   
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Table 4. Test Statistics for Cointegrating Rank 
Null Alt. Trace statistic Null Alt. λmax statistic 
      
r = 0 r ≥ 1  258.62 [0.000]** r = 0 r = 1 178.61 [0.000]** 
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 80.01 [0.366] r = 1 r = 2 32.66 [0.278] 
r ≤ 2 r ≥ 3 47.35 [0.747] r = 2 r = 3 24.55 [0.429] 
r ≤ 3 r ≥ 4 22.80 [0.960] r = 3 r = 4 11.71 [0.933] 
r ≤ 4 r ≥ 5 11.09 [0.954] r = 4 r = 5 6.66 [0.957] 
r ≤ 5 r ≥ 6 4.43 [0.861] r = 5 r = 6 3.37 [0.910] 
r ≤ 6 r ≥ 7 1.06 [0.302] r = 6 r = 7 1.06 [0.302] 
            
Notes: r denotes the rank of the long-run matrix. The sample period is 1994:Q1-2003:Q4. The unrestricted 
VAR is estimated with four lags. The small sample size did not allow for a longer lag length. Given this 
constraint, the system with four lags minimized the information criteria (Akaike, Schwarz, Hannan-Quinn). 
Probability values are square brackets. * and ** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 and 
1 percent significance levels.  
 
Table 5. Unrestricted Estimates of the Cointegrating Vectors and Adjustment Coefficients 
 
 
 
 
Estimated eigenvalues
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1.00 0.95 0.89 0.66 0.45 0.26 0.09
Estimated eigenvectors (in columns)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Remit 1.00 -0.15 0.54 0.22 6.10 -0.49 -0.27
Wages_Fce -2.24 1.00 -0.88 -0.41 12.69 1.70 -0.50
ERdh/FF_EUR 14.74 1.14 1.00 -4.25 5.45 5.82 0.22
Dep_dh -7.68 -0.54 0.47 1.00 30.01 -0.78 -0.32
IR_Mor - IR_Fce -0.32 -0.01 0.07 0.03 1.00 -0.01 -0.01
Cstr 7.54 -0.32 2.05 -2.22 -61.12 1.00 1.23
GDP 7.20 0.21 -1.89 0.92 8.23 -0.59 1.00
Estimated adjustment coefficients (in columns)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Remit -0.20 0.29 -0.41 -0.58 0.00 -0.88 0.11
Wages_Fce -0.02 -1.88 0.09 0.33 0.00 0.03 0.08
ERdh/FF_EUR 0.00 0.55 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 -0.04
Dep_dh 0.04 0.50 0.02 -0.49 -0.01 0.25 0.00
IR_Mor - IR_Fce 0.95 -15.44 -6.36 -8.89 0.11 -2.58 -0.43
Cstr -0.04 -0.95 -0.14 0.50 0.00 0.03 0.10
GDP -0.11 -0.42 -0.04 -0.85 0.01 -0.10 -0.11
Notes: The estimation period is 1993:Q1-2003:Q4.  
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Table 6. Error Correction or Short-Run Model 
∆ Remit t-values
ECM_1 -0.40 -2.01
∆Wages_Fce (FF or Euro) -1.72 -0.89
∆Cstr 4.03 2.74
∆GDP -1.84 -1.63
∆IR_Mor 0.08 1.03
∆IR_Fce -0.12 -1.79
∆Dep_ -0.82 -0.88
∆Dep_1 2.65 2.92
∆Dep_2 0.75 0.78
∆Dep_3 -0.84 0.94
∆Dep_4 -0.25 -0.28
∆ER dh/FF 6.11 1.15
∆ER dh/FF_1 -3.78 -1.21
∆ER dh/FF_2 -0.18 -0.06
∆ER dh/FF_3 -3.02 -0.92
∆ER dh/FF_4 -3.28 -1.07
∆Price 6.45 1.92
∆price_1 -3.90 -1.24
∆price_2 -2.04 -0.66
∆price_3 3.02 0.85
∆price_4 -0.22 -0.07
Constant -0.21 -1.96
Goodness of fit and mispecification tests
Nb. Obs.  =  35
R2    =    0.78
Std Err   =  0.07
AR 1-5:  F(5,8)   =   2.4656  [0.1232]
ARCH 1-5 test:    F(5,3)   =  0.10448 [0.9837] 
ARCH 1-2 test:    F(2,9)   = 0.016137 [0.9840]
Normality test:   Chi^2(2) =   1.4282 [0.4896] 
RESET test:       F(1,12)  =  0.66294  [0.4314]
Notes: The estimation period is 1995:Q1-2003:Q3.  The dataset is taken from the  Moroccan authorities 
and the International Financial Staistics. The variables are defined in section III.B. The error correction 
model includes 4 lags for deposits, prices and the exchange rate to reduce the serial correlation in the 
error terms.  Note that the 't' statistic  for ECM does not follow the standard 't' distribution, but rather 
another distribution tecm. See further discusion in the appendix. For the mispecification tests, probability 
values are in square brackects.  
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